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This paper examines the effect of state-led industrialisation, trade liberalisation, 
economic reform and world demand on the growth and composition of Dominican 
exports during the twentieth century. This involved construction of long-run time series 
for the real value, volume and market prices of total exports from 1905-2000, and of FTZ 
exports from 1976-2000, including disaggregated FTZ exports by commodity group when 
possible. Despite the common assertion that trade liberalisation has spearheaded export 
growth and diversification in developing countries, the process in the Dominican 
Republic has been driven largely by US trade policy, suggesting that trade liberalisation 
in the developing country cannot guarantee export growth unless it is accompanied by 
improved market access in the destination market(s). Furthermore, evidence of export 
diversification in the Dominican Republic is more apparent than real, with sugar 
continuing to dominate primary exports and FTZs dominating manufactured exports, and 
low-technology, labour-intensive textile and garment production in particular. At the 
same time that the composition of FTZ export composition has narrowed, so too have 
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1 Introduction 
  Globalisation has been accompanied by optimism that the new opportunities will 
enable developing countries to trade their way out of poverty.
1 In the smaller economies 
in Latin America the export sector is often one of the leading sectors because, given the 
relatively small size of the domestic market and the restrictions imposed on it by unequal 
income distribution, the export sector is the only one that is not limited by the size of the 
domestic market. 
  Trade liberalisation promotes exports by eliminating the strong anti-export biases 
created by quantitative restrictions and tariffs. For example liberalising tariffs on 
intermediate inputs for export production eliminates the input tax source of bias, and 
lowering tariffs on imports of raw materials and capital good inputs for exports improves 
the competitiveness of the export sector vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Milner 1990, p. 
89).
2 What has ultimately made this strategy possible is reduced tariff access to otherwise 
protected OECD and US markets, which is increasingly contingent on reciprocal 
liberalisation of developing country markets to imports from the US and other OECD 
countries. 
  This paper considers the impact that domestic trade policy and the openness of 
destination markets has on export growth and composition. To this end the Dominican 
Republic is used as a case study. As noted in the Introduction, the Dominican Republic 
outperformed all other Latin American countries in terms of export and GDP growth in 
the 1990s, and its export structure shifted from primary export commodities to resource-
based and non-resource-based manufactures.  
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews trade policy in the 
Dominican Republic throughout the twentieth century, including exchange rate policy 
and tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Trade policies that affected imports and exports 
are examined in order to establish whether an anti-export bias resulted from these 
policies. As the US was the country’s most important export market and enjoyed strong 
bargaining power, preferential market access agreements with the US are appraised as 
well.  
  Section 3 first assesses the impact of trade policy reforms on export growth and 
then considers the extent to which trade liberalisation has improved the competitiveness 
of Dominican exports in terms of gaining an increased share of the US import market, 
particularly vis-à-vis its Caribbean Basin competitors. It also explores the relationship 
between trade policy reform and the commodity composition of exports. It is concluded 
                                                 
1 UNCTAD (2002). 
2 Policy recommendations in favour of trade liberalisation follow from a particular 
interpretation of the East Asian ‘miracle’ that attributed high rates of export and economic growth 
to a more neutral policy incentive structure (for example, maintaining realistic exchange rates, 
phasing out quantitative restrictions and reducing the tariff spread on imports and exports, see 
Balassa (1989), World Bank (1987). The positive association between trade liberalisation and 
export growth has also been supported more recently by Thomas (1991), Weiss (1992), Joshi 
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that export growth and diversification were rooted in greater market access rather than 
resulting from more competitive supply conditions, such as lower labour costs. They 
were made possible by US trade policy changes in the 1980s aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of US manufacturing firms. In contrast, the literature tends to link export 
performance to the trade policies of developing countries, with an emphasis on creating 
more favourable production conditions through the liberalisation of trade and financial 
markets. However trade liberalisation cannot secure export growth in the absence of 
market access. 
2  Trade policy in the Dominican Republic and trade relations with the US 
  Export duties and controls, quantitative restrictions on imports, high tariff barriers 
and overvalued exchange rates are all characteristic of state-led industrialisation drives, 
particularly in the case of import substitution industrialisation. These instruments have 
long been regarded as imparting a strong anti-export bias by distorting the price signals to 
which the private sector responds, discouraging investment in the export sector and 
reducing export growth. By setting a more realistic (or even undervalued) exchange rate, 
removing import restrictions (particularly on imported inputs for export production) and 
reducing or eliminating export duties and taxes, trade liberalisation brings domestic 
prices into closer alignment with international prices, which encourages export growth by 
making exports more internationally competitive and facilitating access to cheaper 
imported inputs. Similarly preferential market access agreements encourage export 
growth by lowering the cost to consumers of the export products vis-à-vis those of its 
competitors. 
  The long run trends in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade appear to confirm the 
existence of a strong anti-export bias in the Dominican Republic.
3 As shown in Figure 1, 
tariffs on imports were generally quite high during the twentieth century and those on 
exports were substantially lower, except in 1915-35, when they averaged 13.6 per cent, 
compared with 5.7 per cent for imports. The ratio of import duties to imports fell below 
the period average only in the 1910s, decreasing from 51 per cent of imports in 1905-9 to 
just 6 per cent by 1920, and also from the mid 1960s to the early 1980s, reaching 9 per 
cent of imports by 1984.
4 Thereafter the average import tax rate was increased from an 
                                                 
3 The ratio of revenue from export duties to the total value of export goods and the ratio of 
revenue from import tariffs to the total value of imported goods are used as proxies for tariff and 
non-tariff protection and for trade policy disincentives to export activities. 
4 This corresponded to the introduction of new tariff laws in 1909 and 1919 by the US customs 
authority and military government. The US had seized the Dominican customs houses in 1905 
following soaring external debt and escalating threats by creditor nations. The US formalised its 
control over the country’s finances in 1907 and occupied the country from 1916-24 on the 
grounds that the conditions laid down in the 1907 Dominico-American Convention had been 
violated. On the US customs receivership, see Hollander (1907) pp. 405-426. On the US financial 
intervention and military occupation, see de la Rosa (1987), Calder (1984),  and Welles (1966). 
Although data on import duties are not available for the 1930s and 1940s, the apparent increase in 
the import tariff rate in the late 1920s and early 1930s probably reflects a fall in import volume QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 4 
average of 11 per cent in 1980-84 to 19 per cent in 1995-99 and as high as 30 per cent in 
2000 due to the government’s attempt to curb a 500 per cent increase in import volume. 
The increased ratio of export taxes to exports in the 1950s and from the mid 1960s to the 
late 1970s reflects the government’s efforts to take advantage of the increase in coffee 
and cacao export trade, whose prices had experienced compound annual average rates of 
22 per cent and 18.3 per cent in 1944-54 respectively.  
 























































Export taxes % exports
Import duties %
imports
Customs taxes % trade
Note: Import and export duties interpolated by geometric mean in 1931-45, 1947-9.  
Sources: Secretaría de Estado de Tesoro y Comercio (1939) pp. 11, 100-1, (1940) p. 46, (1946) 
pp. 150, 154, 156-7, 184, (1950) pp. 530-5, (1951) p. 360, (1955) pp. 352, 407-8; JNPC (1963) 
Table 92, Wilkie (1974) p. 228, ONE (1974) pp. 13-6, (1976) pp. 6, 14-7, (1978) pp. 12-4, (1981) 
pp. 10-2, (1984) pp. 9-12, ONAPRE (1988) pp. 16-9, (1991) pp. 16-8, (1994) pp. 16-8, (1997) pp. 
21-3, (1999) p. 11, BCRD (2000) p. 81. 
 
  The period of US occupation (1916-24) also saw a dramatic reduction in non-
tariff barriers to trade. However these slowly crept back up in the late 1920s and 1930s as 
                                                                                                                                                   
rather than changes to the import-tariff schedule, since under the terms of the US withdrawal in 
1924 the 1919 Tariff Law and the structure of public revenues were to remain in place until the 
country’s debt was retired. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 5 
the Dominican government was able to circumvent the prohibition on tariff reform (as 
dictated by the conditions of the US withdrawal) by introducing licenses, permits and 
quotas. This was aimed at curbing the foreign exchange losses caused by the volatile 
world market prices for sugar. Many of the tariff and non-tariff barriers were retained 
well into the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in high rates of effective protection for many 
industries, including foodstuffs (374 per cent) and non-metallic furniture (212 per cent) 
(Table 1). This period also saw the implementation of an export promotion framework. 
To encourage investment (and especially foreign direct investment) in export production, 
controls on currency, imports and credit were loosened and the requirement to surrender 
foreign currency earnings to the Central Bank at the official exchange rate was waived.  
 














Milk-based products  22.0  66.8  16.1  53.8  108.3 
Fats and cooking oils  66.3  111.1  9.2  46.9  283.1 
Bakery goods  60.0  104.8  27.5  65.3  126.7 
Diverse foodstuffs  71.5  116.3  16.3  54.0  374.1 
Knitted articles  98.0  135.8  9.4  47.2  199.5 
Clothing 52.0  89.8  10.5  48.3  121.4 
Non-metallic furniture  70.0  107.8  32.1  69.9  212.2 
Paper packing 
materials 
5.0 42.8  26.2  64.0  15.4 
Basic steel and iron 
products  5.0 42.8  9.3  47.1  31.7 
Non-electric 
machinery 
14.0 51.8  9.8  47.5  77.3 
Electric machinery  7.0  44.8  12.6  50.4  34.0 
Source: Moya Pons (1992) Table 15 
 
  These reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers to exports in the 1980s were 
accompanied by currency devaluation and unification of the exchange rate system. For 
most of the century the Dominican peso had been pegged to the US dollar at par, but it 
had increasingly become overvalued. By the early 1970s the price of the US dollar on the 
parallel market was on average 14 per cent higher than the official rate, and this gap had 
steadily increased to 27 per cent in 1980-81, 46 per cent in 1982, 60 per cent in 1983 and 
183 per cent in 1984, which corresponded to a growing trade deficit from US$89.8 
million in 1975-79 to $438.8 million in 1980-84. In 1985 the peso was devalued, unified 
and floated in accordance with the terms of an IMF stabilisation programme. The peso 
fell to 1.98 per dollar and continued its descent through the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
falling by 66 per cent in 1988, 38 per cent in 1990 and 42 per cent in 1991. After 1992, QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 6 
the peso became more stable and depreciation was restricted to 4 per cent per annum, 
with the peso reaching 16.18 per dollar by 2000. Thereafter however there was a massive 
depreciation of 238 per cent and by 2003 the peso had fallen to 54 per dollar.
5 
  To encourage export processing activities in the free trade zones (FTZs) the 
monetary authority eased the currency restrictions. Prior to 1992 FTZ firms were required 
to convert all cash payments for utilities, salaries, taxes and other expenses into the 
national currency at the official exchange rate, but from 1992-95 they were permitted to 
convert foreign currency at the private market-based exchange rate administered by the 
monetary authority, and after 1996 they were able to buy and sell currency on the free 
market. 
  The real exchange rate takes into account the difference between domestic and 
foreign prices. While there is insufficient data on consumer prices in the Dominican 
Republic prior to 1947 to conduct a longer run analysis, after 1947 there was only one 
episode of real devaluation. This was in 1984-88, when there was a 52 per cent decline in 
the peso relative to the dollar (Figure 2). The appreciation of the real exchange rate from 
1990 was associated with a delayed and inadequate adjustment of the crawling peg to 
rising consumer prices. 
 
                                                 
5 The official and black market exchange rates from 1966 onwards are presented in Table 1A 
in the Appendix. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 7 
Figure 2. Real exchange rate, 1947-2000  


























































Note: The real exchange rate is the product of the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of domestic 
to foreign prices. The Dominican consumer price index (1970 base year) and the US producer 
price index (1970 base year) are used to calculate the ratio of domestic and foreign prices.  
Sources: BCRD, Boletín Trimestral (various issues), Astroga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2003).  
 
  Improved trade with the US was another important factor in export growth and 
composition. The US introduced a series of tariff reductions on Dominican imports,
6 
following its customs intervention in 1905 and military occupation from 1916-24.
7 This 
helped to concentrate Dominican export orientation to the US. From 1905-59, 42 per cent 
                                                 
6 For details of these reductions, see Table 2A in the Appendix. 
7 The increased US intervention in Caribbean affairs towards the end of the nineteenth century 
was reflected in the Spanish-American War and strict observance of the Monroe Doctrine. The 
dramatic fall in exports to the US after 1920 was due to the emergency tariff of 1921 and the 
Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922, which set the duty on sugar at 2.00 and 2.21 cents per pound 
respectively (Table A 2 in the Appendix). In contrast the duty on Cuban sugar was set at just 
1.7648 cents per pound, and as a result US imports of sugar from Cuba rose from 1,639.9 
thousand metric tons in 1910/11-1912/13 to 3,521.7 thousand metric tons in 1922-24 (FAO 
1961). The slack in Dominican sugar exports was picked up by the UK, France and Ireland. For 
instance, the UK’s share of Dominican sugar exports rose from 2.3 per cent in 1913 to 30.9 per 
cent in 1927, see Ellis (1933) p. 31. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 8 
of Dominican exports were destined for the US market. Although the early 1960s were 
marked by political and economic instability following the overthrow of the Trujillo 
dictatorship in 1961 and civil war, the US intervention in 1965 saw further consolidation 
of export orientation to US. By 1969, 88 per cent of Dominican exports were destined for 
US consumption. Although this share declined in the 1970s and 1980s, it was still 
sizeable at 67 per cent. Dominican exports to the US rose again to average 87 per cent of 
total exports from 1997-2002 (Figure 3). Finally, Dominican exports benefited from the 
US’s efforts to improve the competitiveness of US companies, particularly those in the 
garment and textile industries, by allowing them to relocate the labour-intensive stages of 
production offshore. 
 
Figure 3. US share of Dominican exports, 1905-2002  





















































Sources: US Census Bureau (1997), BCRD Boletín Trimestral (various issues), IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics (various issues). 
 
  This section has traced trade policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the 
twentieth century, with a particular focus on tariff reform and exchange rate policy. It 
also noted the importance of the US as the country’s main export market, especially from 
the 1960s. The following section will examine the extent to which the developments in 
trade liberalisation and market orientation spurred per capita growth and export 
diversification. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 9 
3  Dominican export performance  
3.1  Export growth 
Figure 1.4 shows per capita growth of Dominican exports between 1905 and 2000, which 
averaged 4.5 per cent per annum over the century. It also shows trends in taxes on trade 
and on exports, as well as US demand for Dominican exports over time. The comparison 
suggests that over the century export growth has been driven more by US demand than by 
a decline in export taxes. For instance the 18 per cent per annum growth in per capita 
exports in 1940-50 was spearheaded by a 22 per cent increase in US demand, even as 
export taxes rose from 1 to 8 per cent from 1946-50.
8 Similarly, despite a dramatic fall in 
the export tax rate from 17 to 1 per cent from 1955-65, Dominican exports declined by 3 
per cent per annum in the same period, as US markets began to close to the Trujillo 
dictatorship in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, a 
6 per cent increase in US demand for Dominican exports saw an 8 per cent improvement 
in per capita exports – even as the export tax rate rose from 0.8 per cent in 1965 to 17 per 
cent by 1975. Only in the 1990s is there evidence of a strong inverse relationship between 
export growth and the liberalisation of export trade. 
 
Figure 4. Exports per capita, tax rates, and US demand 1905-2000  






























































































Exports To the US Export tax rate Import tax rate
 
                                                 
8 Export tax data are available only before 1930 and after 1946, see the discussion in section 2.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 10 
Note: Exports and exports to the US shown on the left axis; export and import tax rates shown on 
the right axis.  
Sources: JNPC (1963) Tables 56, 59, 60, 67, ONE (1967), Table 75, Muto (1976), Tables 62-65, 
Cassá (1988), Martí Gutiérrez (1997), CEDOPEX (1995-6), BCRD Boletín Trimestral (various 
issues), BCRD (2000), Wilkie (2002), Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2003). See also sources 
and notes for Figure 1. 
 
  The comparison of trends in Dominican exports and particularly of US demand 
with the evolution of taxes on trade is also revealing. The fall in the import tax rates from 
57 to 6 per cent in the first 2 decades of the twentieth century saw a 12 per cent increase 
in exports to the US and a 13 per cent increase in exports. Similarly, the fall in import tax 
rates from less than 7.6 per cent in 1950 to 1.3 per cent in 1982 saw exports to the US rise 
by 4 per cent per annum and exports rise by 3 per cent per annum. When the import tax 
rate increased from 12 per cent in 1921 to 22 per cent in 1934, US demand for exports 
fell by 13 per cent per annum, and exports fell by 7 per cent. What this suggests is that 
trade liberalisation has had an indirect effect on export growth, by buying greater access 
to the US. 
  Although the data would support the claim that trade liberalisation in the 
Dominican Republic played an important role in the increase in US demand, closer 
inspection suggests that US demand for Dominican exports hinges more on trade 
liberalisation in the US market than on trade liberalisation in the Dominican Republic.
9 
  The data indicate that despite the dramatic liberalisation of trade in the 1910s and 
1920s (Table A 6), the US share of Dominican exports averaged less than 40 per cent in 
1923-49. This was largely due to greater competition in the primary commodity markets 
after 1920 and growing protectionism by the US, beginning with the emergency tariff of 
1921 and the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 (see Table A 7). The increase in exports 
to the US from the late 1930s to the mid 1970s, though coinciding with a decline in taxes 
on trade in the Dominican Republic, corresponded more to a series of Sugar Acts that 
granted the Dominican Republic increasingly preferential tariff treatment. 
  Whether trade liberalisation in the Dominican Republic gave the country a 
competitive edge over its competitors, especially those in the Caribbean Basin is also 
debatable. Despite trade liberalisation, however, the Dominican Republic has not been 
able to increase its US market share. The Dominican share of the US import market is 
shown in Figure 5. A comparison of Figure 3 and Figure 5 suggests that the US import 
market was far more responsive to trade policy reform in the early part of the century 
than in any other period. For instance, liberalisation measures in 1909 and 1919 were 
followed by an increase in import shares from 0.15 per cent in 1910 to nearly 0.6 per cent 
in 1915 and 1920. On the other hand the increase in import shares from the 1940s 
                                                 
9 The problem of endogeneity is worth noting here in that preferential market access for 
certain exports is more often than not contingent on a reciprocal opening up of trade flows in the 
beneficiary country through the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in certain 
imports. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 11 
onward, peaking at 0.88 per cent in 1962, was related to the redistribution of US sugar 
quotas and coincided with an increase in the average duty on exports (from 7.9 per cent 
of export value in 1927-44 to 9.0 per cent in 1944-64, see Figure 5). Furthermore, despite 
a fall in the average duty on exports from the mid 1960s to a negligible level in the 1990s 
the Dominican Republic’s import market shares declined to converge on the century-long 
average of 0.36 per cent. In this context however it is worth noting that the US import 
market shares rose from mid 1980s to reach 0.79 per cent in 1997. This appears to have 
been related to the implementation of the 1983 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 
the Twin Plants Scheme of 1986 and the Special Access Programme of 1986 in the US. 
These granted the Caribbean Basin countries duty-free entry for specific goods. Real 
exchange rate devaluation in the Dominican Republic in the mid to late 1980s also helped 
to make exports more competitive. The dramatic drop in import shares to 0.36 per cent 
after 1997 reflected a general loss of competitiveness, partly as a result of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement between the US and Mexico. 
 


























































Note: US imports include total merchandise, gold and silver.  
Sources: US Census Bureau (1997), IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various issues), 
US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract (various issues). 
 
   An analysis of the import shares of the Caribbean Basin countries reveals changes 
in the competitiveness of the Dominican Republic. Figure 6 shows the shares of the US QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 12 
imports held by the main Caribbean Basin countries (Cuba is included because of its 
importance in the first half of the century). It is clear from the figure that the Dominican 
Republic gained most from the trade embargo against Cuba. Its share of US imports from 
the Caribbean Basin rose from 7 per cent in 1900-65 to 31 per cent in 1965-2000. It was 
certainly one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, with a 3.4 
yearly compound growth in market share in 1982-94 at the expense of El Salvador, Haiti, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, whose import shares declined by 4.2 per cent, 20.9 per cent, 1.2 
per cent and 4.6 per cent respectively. 
  From the mid 1990s however the Dominican Republic increasingly lost shares to 
Honduras. Whereas in 1994 the Dominican Republic and Honduras accounted for 38 per 
cent and 14 per cent of US regional imports respectively, by 2002 the Dominican 
Republic’s share had dropped to 25 per cent and that of Honduras had risen to 20 per 
cent. This again supports the hypothesis that dramatic and sustained trade liberalisation in 
the Dominican Republic in the 1990s did not made the latter a more competitive source 
of imports, or at least not compared with Honduras.
10 
 
                                                 
10 Honduras’s relative competitiveness drew from low labour costs and attractive free trade 
zone incentive packages, including unrestricted currency conversion; unrestricted currency, 
capital and profit repatriation; duty free importation and exportation of machinery and equipment, 
fixtures, spare parts, office supplies, raw materials and supplies; streamlined customs procedures 
with minimal paperwork for incoming and outgoing shipments; exemption from income, city and 
country sales and corporate taxes and fees; and the availability of low-cost, local raw materials 
and skilled and unskilled labour. Although the unemployment rate in the Dominican Republic 
was substantially higher than in Honduras (16.1 per cent and 3.6 percent of the labour force 
respectively in 1995-97), salaries in the Dominican Republic were higher than in Honduras. The 
monthly salary of unskilled workers in Honduran free trade zones in 1997 was about US$100 
lower than in the Dominican Republic: $172 per month compared with US$272 per month. This 
might have been due to disparities in the quality of labour between the two countries, since the 
literacy rate in Honduras was 10 per cent lower than in the Dominican Republic (72 per cent 
compared with 82 per cent in 1990-2000). Data are from World Bank (2001), UNAT (1999) p. 9, 
CNZFE Informe Estadístico (various issues), and Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2003). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 13 
Figure 6. Central American & Caribbean US import share, 1900-2002  





























































Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various issues), US Census Bureau 
Statistical Abstract (various issues). 
 
  Decomposing imports with the data available for 1989 to 2003 lends further 
support to this hypothesis, since the Dominican Republic lost US import shares under 
both full-duty (by 4.2 per cent per annum) and preferential import programmes. The 0.9 
per cent per annum fall in import shares under the CBI import programme saw a 3.1 per 
cent increase in the Honduran share. Similarly, under the GSP import programme, the 
Dominican Republic’s share fell by 4.3 per cent per annum while those of Honduras, 
Guatemala and El Salvador increased by 7.6 per cent, 9.6 per cent and 10.6 per cent 
respectively. Under the Caribbean Basin Textile Parity Act (CBTPA) of 2000, the 
Dominican share declined by 2.1 per cent in 2000-03. Those of Honduras and Guatemala 
increased by 1.7 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively. With a share of 37 per cent of 
regional imports in 2003, Honduras became the biggest exporter to the US under the 
CBTPA. 
  In sum, the US demand appears to have been a more influential factor in the 
Dominican Republic’s per capita export growth than the liberalisation of taxes on exports 
and imports. Certainly, its improved competitiveness following trade policy reform in the 
1910s and 1990s resulted in clear increases in export growth. Nevertheless the largest 
increases in both export growth and US import share from the mid 1940s to the mid 
1960s coincided with greater trade regulation (see Figure 1) and better access to the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 14 
preferential US sugar market as a result of successive amendments to the 1937 Sugar Act. 
This highlights the importance for long run export growth of securing preferential 
treatment in world export markets and the lengths to which countries are willing to go to 
secure them, including unilateral and bilateral liberalisation of trade and financial 
markets. The fact that the Dominican Republic’s exports lost market share to its 
Caribbean Basin competitors, particularly Honduras, suggests that unilateral liberalisation 
alone was not sufficient to improve its cost competitiveness, particularly in the case of the 
low-technology, labour-intensive exports that benefited from the CBI, GSP and CBTPA 
agreements and typically characterised FTZ production. Thus in future it will need to 
focus on improving the quality of its labour force if it is to gain competitive advantage in 
production techniques that are intensive in skilled labour.
11 
  The fact that the greatest losses occurred under the GSP import programme is 
particularly alarming because of its implications for the retention of export externalities.
12 
An interesting task for future research would be to compare trade policy reform in the 
CBI countries to ascertain why Honduras gained US import shares at the expense of the 
other Caribbean Basin countries. Clearly, further research is needed to explain the 
relative shift in US import shares between the CBI countries, which appears to have been 
due more to higher labour costs, and perhaps to constraints on productive capacity and 
investment, than to concentrating on products characterised by less dynamic demand or 
the existence of more favourable US trade policies for other countries. 
3.2  Export composition 
  In addition to stimulating export growth, trade liberalisation encourages a more 
diverse export commodity basket. According to Tyler (1981) and Helleiner (1995), 
greater access to capital and intermediate imports has positive ramifications for non-
traditional exports, particularly manufactures, in that it facilitates the transfer of implicit 
and embedded technical know-how.
13 The following subsections will examine the 
relationship between trade policy reform and export composition. The analysis focuses on 
(1) the relative shares of primary and manufactured export commodities in total 
commodity exports; (2) the relative shares of sugar, coffee, cacao and tobacco in primary 
export commodities; (3) the relative shares of national and FTZ manufactures in 
manufactured exports and (4) the composition of FTZ manufactures. 
 
Traditional and non-traditional exports 
                                                 
11 Taking the literacy rate as a rough indicator of labour quality and skill, with a literacy rate of 
83 per cent in 2000, the Dominican Republic has a strong comparative advantage relative to El 
Salvador (77 per cent), Honduras (73 per cent), Nicaragua (67 per cent) and Guatemala (65 per 
cent), but it still lagged significantly behind Costa Rica (95 per cent) and Cuba (96 per cent) 
((Astorga et al., 2003). 
12 This was due to differences in the conditions on the origin of inputs under the CBI, GSP and 
CBTPA import programme. 
13 See also (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 15 
  The trend in the composition of Dominican commodity exports shown in Figure 7 
suggests that from the mid 1970s the export sector underwent a considerable structural 
change that led to a dramatic shift in export composition away from traditional 
(agricultural and mineral primary) exports. Averaging 81 per cent of exports in 1905-75, 
traditional primary exports fell steadily thereafter to account for 57 per cent of total 
commodity exports in 1990 and just 6 per cent in 2000. In contrast, the growth of non-
traditional exports increased from 6.4 per cent per annum in 1905-60 to 13.5 per cent per 



























































Sources: JNPC (1963), Tables 56, 59, 60, 67, ONE (1967), Table 75, Muto (1976), Tables 62-65, 
Cassá (1988), Martí Gutiérrez (1997), CEDOPEX (1995-6), BCRD Boletín Trimestral (various 
issues), BCRD (2000), Wilkie (2002), Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2003). 
Commodity composition of traditional exports 
                                                 
14 Trujillo’s assassination in 1961, successive coups in 1962 and 1963 political disintegration 
that culminated in the 1965 civil war and US military intervention hit manufactured exports 
particularly hard and caused an 18.1 per cent decline in real growth between 1960 and 1966. For 
this period in Dominican history, see Wiarda and Kryzanek (1982) pp. 537-34 and Moya Pons 
(1997), p. 45. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS161    Page 16 
  The decrease in traditional exports noted above masks the continuing dominance 
of sugar, despite the changes made to trade policy during the century. A comparison of 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 suggests that the apparent diversification of agricultural exports 
from the 1940s reflected relative changes in export commodity prices rather than a 
qualitative shift in export production. Indeed sugar accounted for an average of 87 per 
cent of exports by volume until 1990, after which its share dropped to 80 per cent. This 
suggests that trade policy reform did not cause a significant diversification of export 
production – except arguably since 1990 – and that export production tended to 
concentrate on a primary export commodity whose world price was substantially lower 







Figure 8. Composition of traditional 
agricultural exports by value, 1905-2000 
Figure 9. Composition by traditional 








































































































   
Sources: Muto (1976), Tables 62-65, Cassá (1988), Martí Gutiérrez (1997), BCRD, Boletín 
Trimestral (various issues), BCRD (2000). 
 
  The prices for Dominican sugar are both lower and less stable than those for 
coffee, cacao and tobacco (Figure 10).
15 Sugar prices averaged $143 per metric ton in 
                                                 
15 A more precise comparison of prices for these commodities would be price per unit cost of 
production, which is likely to occupy a wide range between the relatively more capital-intensive 
production of sugar and the relatively more labour-intensive production of tobacco. However, as 
these data are not readily available for all the commodities nor for the long time period examined 
here, price per unit is used to give an approximate idea of trends in prices and stability over time. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152     Page 17 
1905-2000 while the prices for tobacco, cacao and coffee were substantially higher: $732, 
$654 and $1,107 per metric ton respectively. Coffee and tobacco prices were also more 
stable (coefficient of variation of the growth rate of 4.75 and 4.13 respectively) compared 
with sugar (4.94). 
 





















































Sources: Muto (1976), Tables 62-65, Cassá (1988), Martí Gutiérrez (1997), BCRD Boletín 
Trimestral (various issues), BCRD (2000). 
 
  The reasons for the consolidation of export production under sugar despite the 
latter’s relatively low and volatile prices have received substantial attention from 
Dominican economic historians. Their explanations are generally based on circumstances 
that affected the supply of the other primary commodities, such as the impact of crop 
disease on cacao and tobacco production and the heavy export taxes on low-quality cacao 
and tobacco.
16 
  On the demand side, increasing competition from more efficient cacao and 
tobacco producers
17 and the interruption of trade with the tobacco sector’s principal 
export market, Germany, during WWI resulted in a fall in world demand for these 
commodities. The sharp fall in export prices after 1920 had the knock-on effect of forcing 
the foreclosure and sale of small agricultural holdings, which increased the acreage of 
                                                 
16 See Bryan (1979), Bryan (1983), Lluberes (1984), Baud (1995). 
17 Muto (1976) pp. 50-52, 54-55. 
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land available for sugar cultivation.
18 Also notable was the shift in sugar industry 
ownership from foreign resident capital to non-resident US corporate capital in the 1910s 
and 1920s and the vertical integration of the Caribbean sugar industry with that of the 
US.
19  
 Finally,  preferential  treatment for Dominican sugar in the US market was a key 
factor in consolidating the export sector under sugar. US efforts to protect domestic sugar 
producers from foreign competition and an excess of market demand over domestic 
supply meant that Caribbean Basin sugar exporters could attain higher profit margins if 
they were able to secure preferential tariff treatment or a larger portion of the US sugar 
quota.
20 Moreover the trade embargo on Cuba resulted in the latter’s sugar quota being 
redistributed among the other quota countries in the early 1960s. The Dominican 
Republic was the greatest beneficiary of this and it obtained the largest share of the 
quota.
21 This strengthened the position of the US as the main Dominican export market: 
whereas it had absorbed 9.8 per cent of Dominican sugar exports in 1955-59, by 1962-66 
it accounted for nearly 84.4 per cent.
22 In sum, until the mid 1990s trade policy reform in 
the Dominican Republic concentrated on sugar exports and reflected a US market 
orientation. The declining importance of sugar in the 1990s appears to have been due to a 
reduction of its US market share, which fell from 16 per cent in 1984-92 to 14 per cent in 
1993-2001.
23  
Ore and metal exports 
  Ore and metal mining in the Dominican Republic began in the late 1950s when 
the Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa) set up a bauxite ore (aluminium) mining 
operation. The share of bauxite in total exports rose in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
                                                 
18 The increased acreage given to sugar cane had a negative impact on tobacco growers, who 
competed with the sugar industry for arable land. Land reform under the US military government 
made the dramatic increase in land for sugar cultivation possible, evidenced by an explosion of 
land holdings from 33,790 acres in 1893 to 438,182 acres by 1925. In the eastern region of San 
Pedro de Macorís, seven sugar mills controlled more than two thirds of the total sugar acreage in 
1925, see Báez Everstz (1978) pp. 45-46. Knight (1928) p. 103 suggests that coffee production 
was able to expand during the 1910s and 1920s because it was cultivated in the mountainous 
regions of the Cordillera Central, where growers did not have to compete with the sugar 
industry for terrain. For land reform during the US occupation, see Lozano (1975) p. 87 and 
Calder (1984) pp. 107, 137.  
19 On the sugar industry, see Knight (1928), del Castillo (1985, 1974), Murphy (1990), Ayala 
(1999) and Báez Everstz (1986, 1978). 
20 See Blakey (1912), Ellis (1933), Heston (1987). The Dominican Republic was the main 
beneficiary of the quota system. In 1989, it held 17.6 per cent of the quota, followed by Brazil 
(14.5 per cent), the Philippines (13.5 per cent) and Australia (8.3 per cent). Data are from USDA 
(2004) Table 43. 
21 The Dominican share of the US sugar quota averaged 16.8 per cent from 1987-92. Data are 
from USDA (2004) Table 43. 
22 This increase was at the expense of European importing countries, which steadily lost 
shares. The UK alone had absorbed 54.4 per cent of Dominican sugar exports between 1955 and 
1959, see ISO (various issues) .  
23 Calculated from ISO (various). 
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averaging 8 per cent in 1965-71, but thereafter it declined to 0.7 per cent by 1982 (Figure 
11). Fluctuating base metal prices plagued operations. Alcoa halted its operations in 1982 
and its mine remained closed until 1987, when bauxite prices rose again and the mine 
was purchased by the Dominican government. A 61 per cent fall in world prices after 
1987 resulted in operations ceasing in 1991. 
  In the 1970s and 1980s, the mining sector became one of the biggest foreign 
exchange generators, peaking at 40 per cent of total exports in 1989. Mining exports were 
spearheaded by ferronickel and doré (a gold and silver alloy). Falconbridge Dominicana 
(Falcondo) began to mine ferronickel commercially in 1971 and became the second 
largest ferronickel producer in Latin America after Cerro Matoso in Colombia. When 
Rosario Dominicana opened the Pueblo Viejo gold mine in 1975, it was the largest open-
pit gold mine in the Western hemisphere. From 3 per cent of exports in 1975, doré 
skyrocketed to account for 27 per cent of total exports by 1980. 
  In the late 1980s, low base metal prices, a weak world demand for nickel and 
unscheduled plant repairs interrupted nickel production. Similarly, the low prices of gold 
in the world market and difficulty with increasing the extraction of gold levels with the 
available technology led to the temporary closure of Rosario Dominicana in 1992-94 and 
again in 1999. 
 
Figure 11. Share of principal exports in total exports, by value, 1905-2000 















































Other traditional agricultural Sugar
Bauxite Doré
Ferronickel Non-traditional
Sources: Muto (1976)) Tables 62-65, Cassá (1988), Martí Gutiérrez (1997), BCRD Boletín 
Trimestral (various issues), BCRD (2000), Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2003). 





  The change in the export structure from primary commodities to manufactures 
rested almost entirely on the final assembly operations of mainly foreign companies 
operating in the FTZs. The growth of FTZ manufacturing was partly due to a strong 
response to the Dominican currency devaluation in 1985 and to the government’s FTZ 
promotion policies. External factors included preferential access to US markets (under 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Special Access Programmes, the Generalised System of 
Preferences, Programme HTS 9802 and section 936 of the internal tax code) and the 
restructuring of the US garment, electronics, medical and footwear industries in response 
to competition from East Asian manufacturers. 
  In contrast, the response of domestic manufacturers to trade liberalisation was 
mixed. While trade policy reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s did prompt an 
increase in domestic manufactured exports, Dominican manufacturers failed to respond 
positively to devaluation and their output declined in the 1980s and early 1990s. There 
was some improvement after 1992, and this was probably related to the abolition of 
export taxes and other restrictions, a simplification of the exchange rate system, the 
reduction of import surcharges and a new export classification. As discussed above, the 
change in the export structure was also associated with a further concentration of export 
markets rather than diversification.  
  The trends in non-traditional exports and FTZ manufactures exports shown in 
Figure 12 suggest that these two sectors responded very differently to trade policy. For 
instance the growth rate of non-traditional exports declined from 6.2 per cent per annum 
and relative stability (a coefficient of variation of 3.09) during the first six decades of the 
century to negative and volatile in real terms from 1961 to 1992 (a -0.5 per cent per 
annum growth rate and coefficient of variation of 5.18).
24 Although the implementation 
of compensatory schemes in the late 1970s and early 1980s to combat the anti-export bias 
did result in an increase in non-traditional exports of 7.0 per cent from 1979 to 1985, 
these exports fell steadily thereafter from US$297.7 million in 1985 to $179.4 million by 
1992, despite a devaluation in 1985. It is worth noting, however, that non-traditional 
exports improved dramatically after 1992 with a 17 per cent per annum increase through 
2000. There are several factors behind this growth: (1) the abolition of export taxes and 
other restrictions in the early 1990s (see Figure 1); (2) a simplification of the exchange 
rate system and the reduction of import surcharges in 1992; and (3) the greater integration 
of domestic products,
25 with FTZ industries utilising domestic manufactures as inputs to 
                                                 
24 Domestic manufactures included processed goods, leather and leather products, fertilizers 
and pesticides, cement, lime plaster and some light industrial machinery. 
25 Inputs that could be sourced domestically included precious and semiprecious stones and 
agro-industrial goods, as well as supplementary products such as tags, cartons, office supplies 
packing and packaging materials, bags printed materials and maintenance supplies, such as 
lubricants and spare parts. 
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the latter (although this last point is difficult to quantify as national exports to FTZs are 
not reported separately). 





















































Source: JNPC (1963) Tables 56, 59, 60, 67, ONE (1967) Table 75, Muto (1976) , Tables 62-65, 
Cassá (Cassá), Martí Gutiérrez (1997), CEDOPEX (1995-6), BCRD Boletín Trimestral (various 
issues), BCRD (2000), CNZFE Informe Estadístico (various issues). 
 
Non-FTZ and FTZ manufactures 
  However, the apparent improvement in performance of non-traditional exports in 
the 1990s is actually rooted in a boom in non-traditional agricultural exports, shown in 
Figure 13. Dominican economist Andrés Dauhajre has attributed the weak performance 
of national manufactures to poorly designed export promotion schemes. He argues these 
schemes failed to encourage industrial exports because they were not part of an integrated 
industrial strategy. Comprising a haphazard assortment of export promotion policies, they 
failed to reduce the administrative cost of exports in part because they lacked real 
authority.
26 
                                                 
26 The Dominican Centre for Exports (CEDOPEX), which was set up to promote non-
traditional exports, operated under great uncertainty. Its executive directors were selected by the 
executive branch but were often replaced by the governing political party. In the period 1990-94 
alone, CEDOPEX had five different executive directors, Dauhajre 1994 p. 39. The process of 
applying for an export license was a deterrent to exporting. The process consisted of 89 steps and 
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Sources: BCRD Boletín Trimestral (2005). 
 
  The performance of FTZ manufactures exports stands in stark contrast to that of 
national manufactures. FTZ exports grew by 18.2 per cent per annum in real terms in 
1976-2000 and accounted for 90 per cent of total exports in 1991-2000. Following the 
1985 devaluation, they experienced strong growth, with a rising average annual growth 
rate from 16.4 per cent prior to 1985 to 19.3 per cent in 1985-92. The sharp increase in 
FTZ exports (by 214 per cent) in 1992-93 partly reflected a change in the classification 
convention and a recalculation of trade in accordance with the 5
th IMF Manual of 
Balance of Payments. The sudden fall in 1994 was due to the loss of contracts to Mexico 
following ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Despite 
this, FTZ exports quickly recovered and grew at an average of 14 per cent per annum in 
1995-2000. 
Free trade zone exports 
  The export concentration associated with trade liberalisation and trade relations 
with the US in the case of primary export commodities and between national and FTZ 
manufactures is also evident in FTZ production.  
  Though legislation creating the FTZ areas dates to 1955, these only developed 
                                                                                                                                                 
took 71 days. Similarly, the Temporary Admission scheme required 63 steps and took 43 days 
and the Special License required nine steps and took 2.35 hours, Dauhajre (1994) p. 63. 
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after the 1969 Law 299 for Industrial Development. Figure 14 below illustrates the 
evolution in FTZ firms and employment from 1969 to 2000. 
 

















































Sources: Compiled from CNZFE Informe Estadístico (various issues).  
 
  The available data on FTZ production by number of firms suggests that 
production was focused on low-technology, labour-intensive textile and garment 
manufactures (Table 2). By 1996, two years after NAFTA took effect, the number of 
textile firms had fallen from 301 to 285, although their share of FTZ firms rose to 65 per 
cent due to a reduction of the total number of firms in the FTZ sector. 
 
Table 2. Composition of FTZ firms, 1983-2000 (per cent) 
  1983 1987 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000
Textiles  57 47 67 70 63 63  65  61 59 57 57 
Other  43 53 33 30 37 37  35  39 41 43 43 
of which: 
Footwear  14  12   5   6   8   8   5   5   5   4   4 
Electronic   4   4   5   5   3   5   4   5   6   6   3 
Jewellery   4   3   3   3   4   4   4   4   3   3   3 
Tobacco   7   4   3   3   2   2   4   5   6   5   6 
Medical   0   0   1   1   0   0   3   2   2   2   3 
Sources: Compiled from CNZFE Informe Estadístico (various issues).  
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  By value, after 1995 textile exports accounted for more than half of FTZ exports 
(Table 3), averaging more than 57 per cent of FTZ export value in 1995-2000. While the 
relative shares of low-technology manufactures such as footwear (mainly leather uppers), 
processed tobacco and higher technology manufactures such as electronic equipment 
remained steady during the 1990s, the relative shares of manufactures at the higher end of 
the technology scale, for instance medical products, fell from 9 per cent of non-textile 
FTZ exports in 1990 to 2 per cent in 2000 (Table 3). This suggests that trade 
liberalisation and reduced-tariff access to the US market prompted a concentration rather 
than diversification of FTZ production. 
 
Table 3. Composition of FTZ exports, 1990-2000 (per cent) 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Textiles  23 26 27 41 44 61 58 63 57 55 53 
Other
1  77 74 73 59 56 39 42 37 43 45 47 
of which: 
Footwear
2  13  12  11  7  8  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  10  12 
Electronic
2  9 8 7 5 6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  9 6 
Jewellery
2  8 7 8 4 3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6  10 
Tobacco
2  3 2 2 1 1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7 7 
Medical
2  9 9 9 8 8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1 2 
Notes:  
1. Other FTZ exports included services such as data processing, translations, computer software 
development and toll-free telephone services for Spanish speakers in the US. 
2. No disaggregated data is available for non-textile exports in 1995-98. 
Sources: CNZFE, Informe Estadístico (various issues). 
 
  As noted earlier, the composition of exports shifted from primary commodities to 
resource- and non-resource-based manufactures during the twentieth century. However, 
there was little change in the country’s capacity to import, particularly from the mid 
1940s, as shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. Net barter and income terms of trade between Dominican exports and imports, 






















































































Income terms of trade Net barter terms of trade
 
Notes: The net barter terms of trade are the ratio of exports to imports. The income terms of trade 
are calculated as the product of the net barter terms of trade and the index of export prices. 
Because official estimates of the index of export prices are not available prior to 1930, the index 
of export prices was calculated with commodity price and volume data using a modified 













0 , where L is the Laspeyres price index for the period t at base year 0. The 
commodity bundle includes sugar, coffee, cacao and tobacco. 
Sources: Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2003).  
 
  Another interesting development was the participation of local capital in FTZ 
production, especially since this had not been explicitly promoted. The earliest year for 
which these data are available, 1992, shows that the Dominican Republic was the second-
most important source of FTZ capital by firm as well as by investment, after the United 
States (Table 4 and Table 5). From 1992 Dominican capital investment in FTZ firms 
grew by a cumulative annual average of 4.8 per cent, compared with the 2.7 per cent 
growth of US capital investment (Table 4). Dominican capital investment was also more 
stable than its US counterpart. Although both underwent a decline after NAFTA took 
effect in 1994 (US capital by 1.8 per cent and Dominican capital by 2.2 per cent), local 
capital recovered more rapidly (a 28.7 per cent increase), while US capital continued to 
drop (-14.9 per cent). 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152     Page 26 
 
Table 4. FTZ firms by origin of capital, 1992-2000 (number) 
Country  of  Origin  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
United  States  197 205 219 215 207 216 249 243 228 
Dominican  Republic  100  95  139 136 124 133 147 145 166 
South  Korea  37 38 36 34 29 31 32 26 27 
Taiwan  12 12 11 11  6  7  8  8  7 
Panama 11  17  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.    11  15  11 
Puerto Rico  8  9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10  5  7  8 
Italy  0 0 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 
Others  39 58 65 67 63 44 39 35  0 
Sources: CZNFE Informe Estadístico (various issues). 
 
Table 5 Average firm investment by country of origin, 1999 






(US$ per firm) 
South Korea  32  1,735,274  54,227 
Taiwan 8  369,000  46,125 
United States  249  6,208,379  24,933 
Panama 11  230,125  20,921 
Dominican Republic  147  2,388,968  16,252 
Puerto Rico  5  56,000  11,200 
Italy 5  4,554  911 
Other 39  618,633  15,862 
Total 496  11,610,933  23,409 
Note: 
1. Investment in Dominican pesos converted to US dollars at the parallel market exchange rate. 
Sources: Martí Gutiérrez (1997), CNFZE Informe Estadístico (1999).  
 
  Foreign investors in the FTZs appear to have retained a high degree of autonomy 
and few made a long- or medium-term commitment to the Dominican Republic, and as a 
result the state encouraged participation of local capital investment in the FTZs. This 
aided greater economic stability as local FTZ industries were less likely to shift their 
operations overseas. 
  This increase in local participation in FTZs can be partly explained by 
organisational reforms, the transformation of former import substitution industries and 
the development of national producer services. For instance, in 1990 Law 8-90 created a 
special FTZ category to allow firms that had until then benefited from the incentives 
accorded to them by the Export Promotion Law 69 of 1979 to enjoy FTZ status without 
having to physically relocate their operations to an FTZ park. The Export Promotion Law 
69 made it possible for export firms with a minimum local capital share of 90 per cent to 
gain access to currency from the BCRD and long term finance from the FIDE. This 
provision was aimed at eliminating the bias in Law 4315 of 1955, which denied access to 
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internal finance to domestic entrepreneurs seeking to set up an FTZ firm.
27 Customs and 
CNZFE officials have confirmed that a large number of national firms were established 
in the special FTZs under Laws 69 and 409.
28 The rapid recovery of non-FTZ 
manufacturing exports in the 1990s noted in Figure 12 further suggests that the import 
substitution and export promotion policies that were declared failures in the 1970s proved 
successful in the longer term.
29 
4 Conclusions 
  The long run trends discussed in this paper suggest that external market access, 
and particularly access to the US market, determined both the growth rate and the 
composition of Dominican exports. Moves towards trade liberalisation reflected attempts 
to gain a competitive advantage over other developing countries by securing preferential 
access to the US market. At the same time, the preferential trade arrangements that 
resulted reinforced the US’s position as the Dominican Republic’s principal export 
market. The country’s acute dependence on the US as a source of imports and an outlet 
for exports gave the US strong bargaining power in trade arrangements. 
  Trade liberalisation was expected to lead to improved competitiveness and export 
diversification. At first glance, this appears to have been the case. However, the country’s 
apparently magnificent export performance becomes suspect when the statistics are 
disaggregated into primary commodities and manufactures and further disaggregated into 
manufactures of domestic and FTZ origin. Primary exports continue to be dominated by 
sugar and FTZs account for nearly all of the country’s manufactured exports, the bulk of 
which are textiles and garments produced by unskilled workers using low technology. 
Meanwhile domestic manufactures have stagnated. This suggests that export 
diversification, particularly in respect of manufactures, has been qualitatively different in 
Latin America’s small open economies than in the larger ones such as Mexico and Brazil. 
The latter countries have been better positioned to cultivate their industrial capabilities by 
exploiting economies of scale and scope – made possible in part by their natural resource 
endowments and population size – and eventually shift their output from internal to 
external markets. In the smaller economies, structural change has not been spearheaded 
by a shift in the market orientation of the existing industrial base, but rather by hosting 
specific (predominantly labour-intensive and resource-intensive) stages of the production 
process that had previously taken place in the destination market. 
  The absence of any real commodity diversification has been compounded by the 
fact that the Dominican Republic’s share of the US import market has fallen in the very 
exports upon which its production is increasingly concentrated. This may be because the 
process of trade liberalisation in the Dominican Republic occurred more or less at the 
same time as that in other Caribbean Basin countries such as Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala, all of which enjoy similar comparative advantages in 
                                                 
27 BCRD (1994). 
28 Personal communications with the ex-subdirector of CNZFE, D. Liranzo, and J. Vilalta 
Garcia, Textile Engineer and President of Special Free Zone Garment S.A. 
29 Jiménez (1996) p. 37. 
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geographic proximity, cheap and abundant labour supplies, and favourable tariff-reduced 
access to the US market. However improvements in transportation and declining 
transportation costs, combined with even cheaper unskilled labour and the growth of 
FTZ-based services such as translation and telephone services, mean that export activities 
are increasingly less constrained by geography, and that geographical proximity to the 
US no longer has the same leverage. In the face of stiff competition, policy makers in 
these countries may feel compelled to further liberalise trade and financial flows in the 
expectation of gaining ever more favourable tariff treatment in the US, and/or turn to 
currency devaluation in order to become more price-competitive than their counterparts. 
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5 Appendix 
 
Table A 1. Official and parallel exchange rates, (pesos per dollar) 




1900 -  - 
1905 -  - 
1910 -  - 
1915 -  - 
1920 -  - 
1925 -  - 
1930 -  - 
1935 -  - 
1940 1.00  - 
1945 1.00  - 
1950 1.00  - 
1955 1.00  - 
1960 1.00  - 
1965 1.00  - 
1970 1.00  1.15 
1975 1.00  1.18 
1980 1.00  1.26 
1985 0.51  3.12 
1990 0.11  11.13 
1995 0.08  13.60 
2000 0.06  16.42 
Sources: Martí Gutierrez (1997), Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2003); BCRD, Boletín 
Estadístico (various issues). 
 
Table A 2. Selected US tariff acts and trade reforms, 1900-2000 
Year  Trade Agreement  Trade Policy 
1897  Dingley Bill  Established tariffs of 1.69 and 1.95 cents per pound on raw and 
refined sugar imports respectively 
1914 Underwood  Bill  Established  tariffs of 1.26 and 1.36 cents per pound on raw and 
refines sugar imports respectively and reduces tariffs on 
Dominican sugar by 25 per cent 








Raised full rate on raw sugar to 2.5 cents per pound 
1934 Reciprocal  Trade 
Agreements Act 
(RTAA; Hull Trade 
Preferential tariff on raw sugar reduced first to 1.5 cents then to 
0.9 cents per pound; full duty lowered to 1.875 cents per pound 
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Pacts)  
1934  Jones-Costigan Act   Dominican Republic allotted 3,334 tons of the US sugar import 
quota 
1937  Sugar Act  Sugar quota allotment raised to 32,143 tons 
1942  Sugar Act   Reduced preferential tariff on raw sugar to 0.75 cents per pound; 
full duty lowered to 0.9375 cents per pound 
1948  Sugar Act  Sugar quota allotment lowered to 8,1335 tons. Tax on Cuban 
sugar reduced to 0.5 cents per pound. Full duty reduced to 0.6875 
cents per pound in 1949 
1951 Sugar  Act 
Amendment; 
Torquay Conference 
Full duty lowered to 0.625 cents per pound. By 1953 Dominican 
sugar quota allotment raised by 8,703 tons. 
1956  Sugar Act  Dominican Republic granted 4.95 per cent of US sugar import 
market 
1960  Sugar Act  Dominican Republic allotment raised from 130,000 tons to 
321,857 tons following the redistribution of Cuba’s 50 per cent 
share of the US sugar quota. In 1961 entry fee of 2 cents per 
pound levied on non-quota sugar from the Dominican Republic, 
later than year purchases of non-quota sugar from the Dominican 
Republic are suspended 
1962  Sugar Act  Import duty on raw sugar set at 0.625 cents per pound. Dominican 
quota reduced from 952,000 to 190,000 tons (later raised to 
255,000); imports of non-quota sugar resumed 
Year  Trade Agreement  Trade Policy 
1963  Sugar Act  Raised the Dominican sugar quota to 385,000 tons 
1965  Sugar Act  Raised the Dominican sugar quota by 123,020 tons after 
reallocation of quota countries’ deficits 
1974  Trade Act  Established the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
providing free entry or preferential tariffs on select imports 
1981 Agriculture  and 
Food Act 
Raised import duties and established a system of country-by-
country sugar import quotas 
1984  Regulation 807 of 
the US Tariff 
Schedule 
Exempted finished products from payment of import duties except 
on value-added outside US customs territory; updated in 1998 as 
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 9802.00.80 
1983 Caribbean  Basin 
Economy Recovery 
Act 
Permitted duty free entry of specific goods from CBI beneficiaries 
except on value-added outside the US customs territory 
1986 Section  936,  US 
Internal Revenue 
Code (Twin Plants 
Scheme) 
US Tax Reform Act 
Permitted transplant of income tax-free operations of Puerto Rican 
firms (known as Section 936 firms) to the Dominican Republic 
subject to the exonerations on customs duties granted under CBI 
1986 Special  Access 
Programme (SAP) 
Liberated CBI quotas through Guaranteed Access Levels (GAL) 
for textiles and clothing and lowered quotas on goods 
manufactured of non-US materials 
2000 Caribbean  Basin 
Textile Parity Act 
(CBTPA) 
Extended equal preferential treatment in customs tariffs to Mexico 
through NAFTA to the Dominican Republic and 23 other 
Caribbean Basin countries 
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Note: Caribbean Basin countries include Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, 
Panama, St. Lucia Island, Trinidad & Tobago. 





































Costa Rica  22 21 21 23 21 19 18 16 15 18 25 21 23 26 27 
Dominican 
Republic 
35 35 36 36 35 36 33 31 30 28 25 24 21 19 21 
El Salvador  6 6 6 7 8 9  10  12  12  12  11  13  10  10  9 
Guatemala  15 18 17 18 18 18 18 17 17 16 15 17 22 23 22 
Haiti  8 7 5 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Honduras  13 13 12 14 15 16 18 20 20 21 19 20 17 16 13 































Costa Rica  25 26 26 24 26 29 29 29 28 28 33 31 30 30 31 
Dominican 
Republic 
40 36 40 43 41 43 44 39 42 46 37 39 39 37 36 
El Salvador  4 4 3 2 2 2 4 4 3 2 3 2 4 4 3 
Guatemala  16 19 15 16 15 11 10 12 11 10 14 13 13 15 15 
Haiti  9 7 5 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CBI  89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
Honduras  7  9  9 10 9  9  9  9 10 9  9 11  11  10  11 
Nicaragua  0 0 2 3 5 5 4 5 5 3 2 3 4 4 4 































Costa Rica  25 21 23 30 25 18 21 30 30 30 31 29 32 15 22 
Dominican 
Republic 
51 53 36 33 37 51 45 48 45 23 35 26 20 18 30 
El Salvador  4 2 6 6 9 7 3 2 3  11  8  12  8  15  12 
Guatemala  7  11 24 23 19 13 21 14 15 24 16 17 20 29 21 
Haiti  8 8 5 3 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Honduras  6 5 5 4 5 9 8 5 7  11  9  14  19  23  14 
Note: CBI refers to imports under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. GSP refers to imports under the 
Generalized System of Preferences. 
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Table A 4. Import shares under the US Caribbean Basin Trade Parity Act, 2000-03  
(per cent) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 
Costa Rica  12  10  9  8 
Dominican  Republic  36 37 35 33 
El  Salvador  0 0 0 0 
Guatemala  13 12 14 15 
Haiti  4 3 3 4 
Honduras  35 35 35 37 
Nicaragua  0 2 3 3 
Source: US ITC (2003). 
 
Table A 5. Dominican exports to the US market, 1905-2002 (million dollars) 
  Dominican exports to the US    Dominican exports to the US 
1905  4.7  1960  112.2 
1910  2.5  1965  104.2 
1915  10.8  1970  179.3 
1920  33.9  1975  596.9 
1925  7.3  1980  500.7 
1930  7.3  1985  692.3 
1935  5.0  1990  1,045.0 
1940  5.4  1995  3,511.2 
1945  14.5  2000  4,474.5 
1950  37.8  2001  4,286.5 
1955  63.9  2002  4,271.3 
Sources: US Census Bureau (various issues), BCRD, Boletín Trimestral (various issues), IMF, 
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook ((various) years). 
 
Table A 6. Dominican export tariff regime, 1904, 1909 and 1919 (dollar per unit) 
 1904  1909  1919 
Sugar
1 0.22  none  none 
Coffee
1 0.75  0.80  2.00
2 
Cacao
1 1.50  1.00  3.00
2 
Tobacco
1 0.70  none  none 
Starch
3 0.50  …  none 
Bee honey
4 0.05  none  none 
Cane honey
4 0.05  none  none 
Wax
1 2.50  none  none 
Cattle horn
5 0.25  none  None 
Tortoiseshell
6   0.50  none  None 
Cowhide
1  1.00 2.00  None 
Divi-divi
7   1.50  none  None 
Goathide
8  2.50 2.00  None 
Timber
7 1-3.00  0.50-1.00  None 
Precious timber
9  1-15.00 none  None 
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Notes: 1. Per hundred kilos. 2. Applicable to low-quality products only. 3. Per barrel. 4. Per 
gallon. 5. Per hundred units. 6. Per pound. 7. Per metric tonne. 8. Per dozen until 1904, thereafter 
per hundred kilos. 9. Per thousand feet.  
Sources: DR Indice (1937) 17(II) p. 196, 19(I) p. 331, 25(I) p. 185. 
 
Table A 7. Preferential US Market Access Agreements  




Import duties levied on value-added 
outside US customs territory only 
Must be made of US 
materials 
Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) 1984 
Duty free entry of specific goods 
from CBI beneficiaries; tax on value-
added outside the US customs 
territory 
Applicable only to non-US 
competing goods; must be 
made of US materials goods; 
must have a minimum value 
added of 35% in the 
beneficiary country and the 
inputs originate in the 
beneficiary or another CBI 
country 
Section 936, US Internal 
Revenue Code 
(Twin Plants Scheme) 
Permits transplant of income tax-free 
operations of Puerto Rican firms to 
authorized countries, same 
exonerations on customs duties under 
CBI applicable to Section 936 firms 
  
Special Access Program 
(SAP) 
Bilateral agreement liberating CBI 
quotas through Guaranteed Access 
Levels (GAL) for textiles and wearing 
apparel, also lowers quotas  
Same value-added and origin 
of materials specifications 
under CBI  
  on textiles and wearing apparel 
manufactured with non-US materials 
 
Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) 
Unilateral agreement, provided free 
entry or preferential tariffs on select 
imports 
Minimum 35% of value-
added must have been 
produced in beneficiary 
country(ies); includes CBI 
countries, Puerto Rico, and 
US Virgin Islands 
Textile Parity Law, 1-
10-2000 
Unilateral accord extending equal 
preferential treatment in customs 
tariffs to Mexico to the DR and 23 
other Central American and 
Caribbean countries 
 
Notes: CBI beneficiary countries were Antigua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, San Kitts, Santa Lucia and 
San Vicente. Eligible countries under the Textile Parity Law include Panama, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Granada, Guyana, Montserrat, 
Dutch Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Santa Lucia, San Vicente and Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and British Virgin Islands.  
Sources: Acosta (2000) p. 8-A, Dauhajre et al. (1989) Appendix. 